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SUMMARY 
This paper describes the essential characteristics of consumer cooperatives engaged in the provision 
of basic services and discusses their applicability as a model for water supply and sanitation service 
provision in urban areas. A cooperative is an autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to 
meet their common economic, social, and cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly-owned and 
democratically-controlled enterprise. The paper focuses on system-wide urban water supply 
cooperatives and it is thus not concerned with urban or peri-urban cooperatives that depend on 
either boreholes or bulk purchases of water from a utility for distribution, nor does it refer to rural water 
supply cooperatives that are generally small. After a general overview of cooperatives and a 
discussion of the main characteristics of utility cooperatives, the paper reviews the case of 
SAGUAPAC, a successful urban WSS cooperative in Bolivia, from which it draws some conclusions in 
the form of a preliminary assessment of cooperatives as a model for delivery of urban water supply 
and sanitation (WSS) services. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The Challenge of Urban Water Supply and Sanitation 
Rapid urbanization is leading to increased urban poverty and greater demand for water supply and 
sanitation services in many developing countries. Such processes place pressure on public water 
utilities, which, to a great extent, have not been able to provide services of good quality to all.  
Greater efficiency, along with the adoption of cost recovering tariff policies, is considered essential for 
utilities to achieve financial autonomy and attract the investment needed for improving the coverage 
and quality of services. Governments, as well as various development agencies, are seeking ways to 
bring about the organizational and cultural changes within water utilities to increase their efficiency. 
1.2 The Search for Alternative Models of Provision of Water Supply and 
Sanitation Services 
In the past decade, attracting private sector participation (PSP) has been heralded as one way of 
increasing efficiency. It is generally argued that private enterprises will have the financial muscle to 
undertake increased levels of investment while avoiding inefficiencies often found in public water 
utilities. In line with this view, a number of developing countries have introduced PSP in the WSS sector. 
PSP in WSS has been limited. Private financing has accounted for less than 10 percent of total 
investment in the sector. In many cases, these public-private partnerships have been successful. In 
some cases PSP has not led to the anticipated outcomes. 
It is increasingly acknowledged that there is no single model of good WSS sector governance.  The 
experiences with PSP have contributed to an increased awareness that the success or failure of utilities 
—public and private—in efficiently providing quality WSS services depends on government practices 
such as regulatory policy and involvement with civil society. To be effective, governance regimes must 
fit the social, economic, and cultural particularities of each country. The key to success is not only 
which ownership structure to choose but also how different ownership structures can adopt practices 
that allow them to overcome challenges. The search for alternative organizational models for service 
provision has hence started to focus beyond ownership structures and is now also focused on 
understanding the practices associated with good performance. As part of this effort, SAGUAPAC—a 
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successful utility cooperative that is owned by its customers—has been identified as a case that can 
provide valuable lessons. 
This paper uses four basic principles to assess to what extent consumer cooperatives can offer an 
alternative institutional model for delivery of urban WSS services: (a) autonomy; (b) accountability for 
results; (c) customer orientation; and (d) market orientation. These key principles put the selection of 
sector reform options on a more rational basis and help create local “customized” solutions, rather 
than “cookbook” solutions. 
1.3 Cooperatives as an Alternative to Public and Private (Investor-Owned) 
Provision 
Over the years, SAGUAPAC has become relatively well-known and is often cited as an example of a 
successful cooperative utility providing urban water services. SAGUAPAC’s performance indicators 
place it among the best WSS utilities in Latin America. Its performance is highly regarded by multilateral 
lending organizations such as the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank and by 
water sector professionals. 
In trying to explain the success of SAGUAPAC, its cooperative structure is often cited as the main 
reason for its high performance. It is argued that this structure shields management from day-to-day 
political interference, allowing it to adopt decisions with regard to key issues such as tariff setting, 
awarding of contracts, and personnel matters based solely on technical considerations. The private 
nature of the cooperative structure also means that SAGUAPAC is in a position to implement 
investment projects much faster and more efficiently than public water utilities because it does not 
have to comply with complicated and slow procurement procedures. 
The success of SAGUAPAC has been used as a strong argument to propagate the cooperative model 
as an alternative to privatization.1 The case of SAGUAPAC certainly deserves attention. However, an 
effort should be made to avoid endorsing the cooperative option without qualification, because other 
utility cooperatives have failed to deliver. For instance, some of the small water cooperatives in Santa 
Cruz as well as the Bolivian telecommunications cooperative COTEL have shown poor performance. 
This paper discusses the reasons behind SAGUAPAC’s success and identifies those elements that hold 
promise for other would-be utility cooperatives. In the end, whether the success of SAGUAPAC is 
replicable will depend on whether the particular conditions that have made it a well-performing utility 
are present or can be replicated in other places. 
1.4 The Structure of the Paper 
The remainder of this paper is organized in three parts. Part 2 starts with a general discussion of 
cooperatives and moves on to discuss utility cooperatives and their characteristics. Part 3 presents a 
case study on SAGUAPAC. This section describes SAGUAPAC’s main characteristics—how it is 
structured and how it operates—and attempts to identify the factors underlying its good performance 
and eventually its success. A short Part 4 concludes with a preliminary assessment of cooperatives as a 
model for delivery of urban WSS services. 
                                                     
1  See, for instance, “Public Sector Alternatives To Water Supply And Sewerage Privatisation: Case Studies,” 
Emanuele Lobina and  David Hall, International Journal of Water Resources Development 16 (1): 35–55, 2000; 
Better Water Services in Developing Countries: Public-Private Partnership, the Way Ahead, Department for 
International Development, UK, 1997. 
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2 AN OVERVIEW OF COOPERATIVES 
2.1 Cooperatives 
2.1.1 The Emergence of Cooperatives and the Cooperative Movement 
The cooperative, as it is known today, began during 
the Industrial Revolution, as farmers, producers, workers, 
and consumers found that they could accomplish 
more collectively than they could individually. The 
cooperative emerged as an alternative way of 
organizing the provision of goods and services in 
response to what were viewed as the adverse 
consequences brought onto workers by the Industrial 
Revolution. 
The cooperative movement has grown steadily since its 
inception (see box 1). In 1895, about 50 years after the 
first modern cooperative started operating, the 
International Cooperative Alliance (ICA) was 
established. The ICA has been accepted by 
cooperatives throughout the world as the final 
authority for defining cooperatives and for determining 
the underlying principles that give motivation to 
cooperative enterprise. Today, around 800 million 
people associated with about 740,000 cooperatives in 
93 countries form the cooperative movement worldwide. These cooperatives generally operate using 
the same principles adopted by the ICA. 
2.1.2 What is a Cooperative? 
The Statement of Cooperative Identity, adopted by the ICA in 1995, defines a cooperative as an 
autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to meet their common economic, social, and 
cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly-owned and democratically-controlled enterprise. The 
statement also identifies the cooperative values (self-help, responsibility, democracy, equality, equity, 
and solidarity) and lists the seven cooperative principles: 
1. Voluntary and Open Membership – Cooperatives are voluntary organizations, open to all 
persons able to use their services and willing to accept the responsibilities that come with their 
membership. 
2. Democratic Member Control – Cooperatives are democratic organizations controlled by their 
members who make decisions and actively participate in setting their policies, serve as elected 
representatives, and have equal voting rights (one member, one vote). 
3. Member Economic Participation – Members contribute equitably to the capital of their 
cooperative receiving limited compensation, if any, on capital subscribed as a condition of 
membership. At least part of that capital is typically the common property of the cooperative. 
Surpluses are usually allocated to the development of the cooperative. 
4. Autonomy and Independence – Cooperatives are autonomous, self-help organizations 
controlled by their members. 
5. Education, Training, and Information – Cooperatives provide education and training for their 
members, elected representatives, managers, and their employees so they can contribute 
effectively to the development of their cooperatives. 
6. Cooperation between Cooperatives – Cooperatives work together through local, national, 
regional, and international structures. 
Box 1  The Birth of the Modern Cooperative 
The idea and practice of cooperation has been 
present since the early stages of civilization, 
because the natural reaction of people is to 
work together for their mutual benefit to solve 
their economic problems. What many consider 
the first successful cooperative was organized in 
the United States in 1752, when Benjamin 
Franklin formed the Philadelphia 
Contributionship for the Insurance of Houses 
from Loss by Fire. The birthplace of the modern 
cooperative era, however, is considered to be 
Rochdale, England. In 1844, the Rochdale 
Equitable Pioneers Society opened a food 
cooperative store. While this was not the first 
cooperative, it was the first one to spell out a set 
of principles on which to operate. The principles 
and practices of the Pioneers ensured their 
success and spread to other cooperatives 
around the world. 
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7. Concern for Community – The goal of cooperatives is the sustainable development of their 
communities. 
The first four principles have a structural orientation, defining aspects that relate to ownership and 
governance, while the last three are concerned with practices. 
In many ways cooperative are like any other business but in several important ways they are unique. 
Like any other business, cooperatives are organizations that operate in the market and are subject to 
the discipline the market imposes. Cooperatives, however, are different from traditional businesses in 
two ways. First, they are motivated by the desire to benefit their members by providing them with a 
good or service in line with a particular set of values. Second, cooperatives are organizations that are 
owned and controlled by the people who use their products, supplies, or services. These two 
characteristics cause important differences in the behavior and performance of cooperatives in 
relation to traditional organizations—public or private. 
2.1.3 Types of Cooperatives 
Three broad types of cooperatives can be distinguished based on what they do for their members. 
Cooperatives are generally producer-owned, consumer-owned, or worker-owned. Producer-owned 
cooperatives help their members produce and market their goods by ensuring supplies and markets. 
They facilitate access to inputs (credit, equipment, and production supplies), to cost reductions, and 
to markets through economies of scale and market power they achieve by jointly bargaining, 
purchasing, processing, and marketing. Consumer-owned cooperatives enable consumers to gain 
access to a wide array of affordable commodities and at-cost services. Commodities are made 
affordable by the greater market power that results from joint action, which strengthens the 
bargaining and purchasing capacity of members. Wider access to services is made possible through 
self-provision in areas where conditions render operations insufficiently profitable for for-profit 
companies. Worker-owned cooperatives are businesses owned and controlled by their employees. 
This type of cooperative has as its main purpose the creation of employment opportunities for its 
members. 
2.1.4 Extensive Experience of Cooperatives throughout the World 
There is relatively little awareness of both the substantial economic and social weight of cooperatives 
throughout the world and the degree of their success in adjusting to different and often hostile 
environments. Cooperatives have contributed to 
the achievement of personal objectives of 
millions of individuals, their families, and their 
communities as well as national economic and 
social progress.  
Cooperatives are a significant component of 
advanced market economies. They operate in 
almost every area of economic and social 
activity and provide a broad range of services in 
sectors such as agriculture, education, finance, 
health, housing, insurance, utilities, and many 
more. It is not easy to calculate the contribution 
of cooperatives to gross national product, 
because no country distinguishes between 
cooperatively organized and other types of 
private business enterprise in its system of 
national accounts. The cooperative share of 
GNP in most developed market economies is 
estimated to be between 5 percent and 20 
percent (see box 2). 
Cooperatives range in size from very small to 
extremely large companies. In the United States, 
more than 20 cooperatives have annual sales in 
excess of US$1 billion. Fourteen agricultural 
Box 2  The Significance of Cooperatives in Market 
Economies 
Cooperatives are an essential component in almost all 
market economies. In Sweden, 99 percent of dairy 
production is marketed by cooperatives owned by 
independent farmers. In Norway, 75 percent of forest 
products are processed and marketed by 
cooperatives. In Italy, 60 percent of wine is produced 
by marketing cooperatives. In the United States, about 
30 percent of farmers' products are marketed through 
cooperatives. In many developing countries rural 
cooperatives play an equally significant role. Savings 
and credit cooperatives (credit unions) are significant in 
the financial sectors of many developed and 
developing countries. Similarly, cooperative insurance 
enterprises are of major significance in many 
developed countries. In Sweden, for example, about 
one-half of the adult population has at least one policy 
with the Folksam group. Japan’s farmers’ insurance 
cooperative is the largest agricultural insurance 
enterprise in the world. In many countries, cooperative 
banks are dominant in the economy: for example, the 
largest European Bank, the French Crédit Agricole, and 
the third largest bank in the Netherlands, Rabobank, 
are cooperatives, that is, they are owned by their 
members who are also account holders. 
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supply and marketing cooperatives were at some 
point included in the “Fortune 500” list of the 
largest corporations. In Canada in 1992, of the top 
10 agricultural firms, 8 were cooperative 
enterprises. 
It is estimated that the total number of members, 
and hence owners, of cooperatives is about 800 
million worldwide. In many countries, the 
membership in all cooperatives is equivalent to a 
high proportion of the adult population. Although 
there are no precise measures of the number of 
individuals who are members of at least one cooperative, for some countries estimates top 70 percent 
of the population (see box 3). 
2.2 Utility Cooperatives 
Utility cooperatives were initially created to provide utility services, mainly in rural areas, where investor-
owned utilities would not expand due to insufficient profitability. Their services are usually provided at 
at-cost prices. 
2.2.1 Types of Utility Cooperatives 
There are three primary types of utility cooperatives: electric cooperatives, telecommunications 
cooperatives, and WSS cooperatives. Electric cooperatives furnish electric power and deliver it to their 
members. Electric cooperatives are of two types: consumer-owned distribution cooperatives that 
deliver electricity directly to consumers; and generation and transmission cooperatives that produce 
and transmit electricity to distribution cooperatives. Telecommunications cooperatives offer services 
such as local exchange services, interconnection to long distance carriers, and other 
telecommunications services including internet access. WSS cooperatives provide (piped or unpiped) 
water supply or sewerage services, or both. In some countries it is not uncommon to find cooperatives 
that provide not just one but two or more of these utility services, especially where there are significant 
economies of scale in one organization providing various services to a relatively small population. For 
instance, rural cooperatives in Argentina provide a range of services often including not only public 
services such as electricity and water but also financial services, housing, and other services. 
WSS cooperatives are predominantly found in rural areas and provide their members with services on 
an at-cost basis. While it is difficult to quantify the role of utility 
cooperatives, it is clear that they 
• provide significant proportions of services not only in 
developing but also in developed countries (see box 4); 
• often provide services in rural areas where neither 
private for-profit companies nor public enterprises are 
present; and 
• in some cases, effectively provide services in large 
urban areas. 
As in other sectors, utility cooperatives are often organized in 
layers with groups of cooperatives constituting other 
cooperatives or associations whose function is to provide 
support to their members. Such associations normally offer a 
variety of training programs; technical assistance programs in 
areas such as operation, maintenance, finance, and 
governance; as well as other services and benefits to their 
members. Often, such second-tier cooperatives form 
federations and, at higher levels of aggregation, 
confederations that can be national or international. For 
example, in the United States, water cooperatives usually join 
Box 3  Countries with Highest Cooperative 
Membership  
70–79 percent: Austria, Canada, Cyprus, Finland, 
Israel, Uruguay 
50–69 percent: France, Belgium, Norway 
40–49 percent: Denmark, India, Japan, Malaysia, 
Portugal, Sri Lanka, the United States  
Source: 1999 ICA figures on individual membership in 
cooperatives that are members of the ICA. 
Box 4  Utility Cooperatives in 
Developed Countries  
In the United States, there are close to 
900 electricity distribution cooperatives 
serving 36 million consumer-members 
in 47 states, or 12 percent of the U.S. 
population, and 65 generation and 
transmission cooperatives. They own 
and maintain some 2.3 million miles of 
electricity distribution lines—or 43 
percent of the nation’s lines—and 
cover 75 percent of U.S. land mass. 
Similarly, more than 1,000 rural 
telephone cooperatives serve millions 
of members in 46 states in the United 
States. Though not as common as 
electric or telecommunications 
cooperatives in the United States, 
water cooperatives—frequently known 
as rural water associations—serve their 
members in rural communities, 
particularly in the West. 
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their State Rural Water Associations, which are also members of the National Rural Water Association, 
a nonprofit federation. 
2.2.2 Distinguishing Characteristics of Utility Cooperatives 
Utility cooperatives have distinctive features originating from their particular ownership and 
governance structure that distinguish them from traditional private (investor-owned) or public utilities 
(see figure 1). Of course, differences are also due to different practices introduced in cooperatives 
versus the ones used in public or private utilities. 
Even though cooperatives are privately owned, they have important differences compared with 
private (investor-owned) utilities. In investor-owned utilities, investors share proportional ownership rights 
to the organization. Few investors, if any, have a commercial relationship with the organization 
beyond their equity investment. The organization’s objective is to maximize profits and distribute them 
based on equity rights. Equity rights are fully transferable, allowing investors to adjust their participation 
to meet their investment objectives and capture fully the capitalized value of their investment. In 
contrast, in the case of a cooperative, ownership of the organization takes a very different meaning. 
Profits are not pursued and if obtained, are generally reinvested in the cooperative. Because 
members cannot withdraw and reallocate their investments, the only way they can capture the value 
of the cooperative’s activities is through the use of the service. Thus, in their dual role of owners and 
users, it is in the members’ interest to have the utility deliver good service at low cost. 
An obvious difference between cooperatives and public utilities is that of ownership rights. At the 
same time, cooperatives and public utilities share a mission: to provide good service rather than 
realize profits. It should be noted, however, that in practice, public utilities often deviate from the 
objective of providing good service due to political interference or lack of accountability. In consumer 
cooperatives, the fact that owners and customers are one and the same helps align objectives. 
The role of owners (members) in cooperative utilities is different than that role in public or private 
utilities. A cooperative is governed by the Administration Board and the Oversight Board, which are 
composed of people selected from within the cooperative’s membership. Cooperative utilities 
exercise a one member–one vote system without taking into account status (individual or institution) or 
consumption levels. In contrast, in private investor-owned utilities, investors’ weight is proportional to 
the shares investors hold, whereas in public utilities, the sole owner is the state. 
The equal weight of vote that cooperative members have provides an incentive for a potentially 
wider participation in the affairs of the utility. In addition, the Administration Board becomes a 
mechanism for close monitoring of the utility by its users. Members of the Administration Board have a 
specific mandate for the provision of a specific service and will thus be elected on their track record in 
the sector. In public utilities, corporate oversight is often through an elected municipal council, but 
council members will generally have a 
broader mandate and will campaign on 
nonsector topics. 
It is common, although not universal, for the 
management team to be selected from 
within the membership of the cooperative. 
This practice implies that managers and staff 
of the cooperative are generally users of its 
service. Smaller cooperatives might face 
difficulties in finding professional board 
members and managers with water sector 
know-how among their membership. 
WSS service provision is a natural monopoly 
and has significant social and environmental 
externalities. Governments seek to ensure 
that utilities’ decisions take social 
consequences into account through sector 
policies and regulation. Regulation also 
seeks to ensure that service standards are 
Figure 1  Characteristics and Potential Implications 
of the Cooperative Structure 
Quality
service
At-cost
service
Externalities
accounted for
Aligned objectives Self-regulation Social calculus
Presence of users 
in Board and 
Management 
Mechanisms 
to incorporate 
preferences 
of users 
Homogeneous 
objectives of 
owners 
Dual role of 
members 
Owners = users
Owners obtain 
benefits only 
from service 
Owners have 
equal weight 
1 member = 1 vote 
Members = Citizens 
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maintained and tariffs are kept at reasonable levels. In the case of public utilities, regulation might not 
be explicitly in place because it is often assumed that such considerations are implicitly incorporated 
in the decision-making process given the broader “public perspective” that a public utility is expected 
to have. The dual role of owners and users in cooperative utilities introduces an element of self-
regulation that is not present in other types of organizational structures. The members on the one 
hand—as users—are interested in keeping tariffs low, while on the other hand—as owners—are 
interested in protecting their assets through cost recovery. Because users are involved in the 
governance of the organization, the incentive to withhold information is lower. Consequently, there is 
less information asymmetry and, potentially, a greater level of trust. The cooperative model also 
provides incentives for internalizing externalities within the service areas. However, other externalities—
such as downstream environmental impacts—will need to be regulated. 
2.2.3 The Cooperative Model and the Four Principles of Good Governance 
The consumer cooperative model is distinct from public and private models on all four basic principles 
of good governance:  
1. Autonomy  – A utility cooperative is more autonomous than a traditional public utility because 
(a) its legal authority is likely to be more clearly defined; (b) its labor policies are not restricted 
by public sector procedures or subject to political considerations; and (c) it has the possibility 
of accessing sources of finance that may not be available to public utilities. Autonomy of a 
utility cooperative is potentially similar to that of a private utility. However, the possibility of 
actually exercising greater autonomy depends to a great extent on ensuring that political 
influence is kept at bay. 
2. Accountability for results – A cooperative is likely to have a lower degree of accountability to 
government (unless government funds are received) and, at the same time, a higher degree 
of accountability to its customers than a traditional public utility. Also, it is likely to have the 
same degree of accountability to government, regulatory, and financial institutions as a 
private utility while having a higher degree of accountability to its customers. 
3. Customer orientation – Utility cooperatives have a higher degree of customer orientation than 
either a public utility or a private utility. Customers have various mechanisms to have a say in 
the affairs of the utility.  Also, the fact that cooperative utilities generally charge their customers 
to finance their operations gives them a greater degree of customer orientation than public 
utilities. 
4. Market orientation – Cooperative utilities have strong incentives for cost reduction. This makes 
market orientation (making use of outsourcing and out-contracting, benchmarking, and other 
mechanisms of quasi-competition) attractive. At the same time, however, a cooperative utility 
is more likely to exercise more direct control over all tasks associated with service provision. 
Outsourcing and out-contracting are not part of the cooperative culture. These two factors 
balance each other out. As a result, a cooperative utility will be less market oriented than a 
private utility, but probably slightly more market oriented than a public utility. 
The cooperative model has certain characteristics that can potentially provide a number of 
advantages over public and investor-owned private utilities. Whether in practice the cooperative is an 
alternative model for WSS provision can only be determined empirically by looking at the performance 
of cooperative utilities compared to private and public utilities. 
The performance of utility cooperatives varies widely. This suggests that there is more to a successful 
cooperative utility than just the ownership structure. The next chapter looks at the case of SAGUAPAC 
to define which factors were critical in its success. 
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3 A CASE STUDY ON SAGUAPAC 
3.1 General Description 
3.1.1 SAGUAPAC in its Institutional Environment 
Origin 
SAGUAPAC (Cooperativa de Servicios Públicos Santa Cruz Limitada) is a cooperative that provides 
water and sewerage services to the city of Santa Cruz, Bolivia. It started operating under its current 
legal structure in 1979 when the national government approved the request of the autonomous water 
board to transform into a cooperative. In the same year, SAGUAPAC was recognized as a 
cooperative by INALCO, the National Institute of Cooperatives. The transformation into a cooperative 
was the second major reform in a decade: in 1973, the Public Works Committee (Comité de Obras 
Públicas) of the central government had handed over responsibility for WSS service provision to the 
autonomous water board in Santa Cruz. 
The decision to turn SAGUAPAC into a cooperative was based on the recognition that a different 
model was needed to provide the service efficiently. Rapid population growth—Santa Cruz had 
tripled in size to approximately 150,000 inhabitants in a decade—heightened the urgency to look for 
alternative models. Santa Cruz was essentially isolated from the rest of the country, resulting in a high 
degree of self-reliance. Central government neglect resulted in a strong sense of regional identity, 
giving rise to a civic movement. The decision to adopt the cooperative model as the organizational 
arrangement for SAGUAPAC was helped by the civic movement’s opposition to state ownership and 
the recognition that community participation was required to obtain service improvements. 
Cooperatives were viewed as a viable alternative in Santa Cruz because two utility cooperatives 
providing electricity and telephone services were already operating. The alternative of private sector 
provision was not considered because, at the time, the private sector in Santa Cruz was 
underdeveloped. 
Current situation and description of the market 
Santa Cruz is a very widespread city of approximately 1.2 million inhabitants that extends over 36,300 
hectares of tropical flatland. SAGUAPAC’s service area covers about 63 percent of the city’s area 
(about 22,700 hectares) in which approximately 66 percent of its population lives. The area that 
SAGUAPAC serves contains the central part of the city and expands to the north and the south (see 
figure 2, marked by blue line).By 2002, SAGUAPAC was providing water to approximately 95 percent 
and sewerage services to about 50 percent of the population in its service area.  While it is by far the 
biggest, SAGUAPAC is not the only provider of water and sewerage services in Santa Cruz. Seven 
other smaller cooperatives are present in the city. 
Santa Cruz is well-endowed with groundwater due to the 
proximity of the Piraí River. Water is obtained from some 
forty-five deep wells distributed in two major fields. The 
sewerage system is divided into two subsystems following 
the city’s topography. The eastern subsystem discharges 
into open fields near the Rio Grande and the western 
subsystem discharges into the Piraí River. A key difficulty 
faced by SAGUAPAC is the high cost of pumping due to 
the flatness of the land and the low population density. 
The evolution of service provision 
In the last four decades, Santa Cruz has had a dramatic 
population growth that has led it to the top of the list of 
Bolivia’s largest cities. Since 1960, the population of the 
city has multiplied eightfold. This accelerated growth rate, 
coupled with low population density, has placed an 
enormous strain on public services and represents one of 
the major challenges SAGUAPAC has had to face over 
Figure 2  SAGUAPAC’s Concession Area  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: SAGUAPAC 
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the years. 
To a great extent, SAGUAPAC has accommodated this 
growth. The cooperative has become the largest urban 
water cooperative in the world, serving approximately 
three-quarters of a million people and billing close to 
US$19 million per year. (See table 1 for other indicators of 
SAGUAPAC’s size.) 
Over the years SAGUAPAC’s performance has been 
considered very good according to international 
standards. It has operated in an efficient manner, 
provided continuous service with water of good quality 
from house connections to its members, and has 
maintained satisfactory financial performance. Water is 
available 99.92 percent of the time. Unaccounted for 
water is 17 percent. SAGUAPAC employs 3.1 staff per 
1,000 connections. The working ratio is 0.55. Some 97 
percent of connections are metered and collection 
efficiency is 95 percent.  More detailed performance figures are given in the annex. 
3.1.2 SAGUAPAC: Internal Functioning and Corporate Culture 
Organizational structure 
The organizational structure of SAGUAPAC is based on a classical cooperative model with a delegate 
assembly - the highest instance in the cooperative that elects both the Administration Board and the 
Oversight Board. In the case of SAGUAPAC, the Delegate Assembly is composed of 27 members, 3 
from each of the 9 districts. This is a distinctive feature, since in some utility cooperatives in Bolivia, the 
assembly is constituted by all those members who choose to attend when the General Assembly is 
convened. 
The General Manager (GM) is appointed by the Administration Board. The GM’s appointment is for an 
open term.  Since 1979 SAGUAPAC has had only four GMs. The previous GM served for close to 18 
years until he passed away. The GM is responsible for appointing managers in four areas: commercial, 
administration and finance, engineering, and planning matters. These managers report to the GM, 
who is the main administrative officer and the link between the Administration Board and 
SAGUAPAC’s personnel. The Commercial Manager is in charge of installations, metering, invoicing and 
collection, and customer relations including 
complaints and enquiries. The Administrative and 
Financial Manager is responsible for accounting and 
finance, human resources, and procurement. The 
Engineering Manager is in charge of service 
provision, overseeing the areas of production, quality 
control, and works (investments) and maintenance. 
Finally, the Planning Manager, responsible for the 
long-term development of the service, is also 
responsible for medium- and short-term planning, 
overseeing the areas of analysis, projects, and 
information systems. The organizational structure also 
contains three levels below the four Area 
Managers— Unit, Department, and Section—for a 
total of five levels. 
Mission and vision 
SAGUAPAC’s mission states its commitment to contributing, under the cooperative philosophy, to the 
improvement of the quality of life of its members through the provision of water and sewerage services 
in its concession area. It seeks to fulfill its mission by making good use of technical, human capital, and 
financial resources while preserving the environment. As part of its vision, SAGUAPAC sees itself as an 
enterprise based on honesty, discipline, efficiency, and efficacy; in which its members have 
confidence; and that tries to contribute to building a better-informed society that values and 
Table 1  Indicators of SAGUAPAC’s size 
Indicator Quantity 
Water 
Water production 45,000,000 m3 
Network length 2,160 km 
No. of connections 120,483 
Population served 752,000 
Sewerage 
Water collected and 
treated 
24,936,554 m3 
Network length 868 km 
No. of connections 63,810 
Population served 398,000 
Source: SAGUAPAC 2002. 
Figure 3  SAGUAPAC’s Organizational Structure 
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safeguards water as a resource (see 
box 5). The spirit of both mission and 
vision is at the center of SAGUAPAC’s 
institutional culture. Its personnel have 
internalized the view that SAGUAPAC 
should provide its members with the 
best possible service while combining 
technology and management with the 
cooperative values of equity and solidarity. 
Values and practices 
SAGUAPAC’s corporate culture embodies the cooperative values of self-help, responsibility, 
democracy, equality, equity, and solidarity. Such values have been instituted over time through 
example and through the adoption of practices conducive to reinforcing them. While the institution 
provides its employees with competitive salaries, work stability, and the possibility of promotions, and 
makes every effort to treat everyone equally irrespective of rank, it demands commitment, discipline, 
and honesty at the individual level. Cases of honest behavior have been openly recognized and held 
as examples, while, as part of a policy of zero tolerance for corruption, the occasional dismissal of an 
employee based on unethical behavior has been widely publicized. To minimize the opportunities for 
foul play, a policy of not paying for overtime has been instituted. Instead, the extra time worked by 
operational personnel is recognized and traded for free time during normal working hours. In the case 
of professionals, extra working time is not compensated. 
The values SAGUAPAC embraces have contributed to the development of a good working 
environment. Absenteeism is low. Staff turnover is low; employees currently working for the 
cooperative are estimated to have an average of around 15 years service. The open and accessible 
attitude is reflected in the structure of its recently completed building. Management communicates 
with the departments and information is shared between departments in an informal manner. 
Recently, structured efforts have been made to further improve knowledge sharing. A Managerial 
Commission, composed of the GM, the Area Managers, and the General Secretary now meets 
regularly to discuss progress and coordinate activities in different areas. The program “Lets Know 
SAGUAPAC” consists of lectures by personnel on how SAGUAPAC operates and the challenges it 
faces. The program aims to develop among its employees a fuller understanding of SAGUAPAC’s 
business. This type of effort complements SAGUAPAC’s history of investing in the training of its staff. 
Salary adjustments are based on performance and years of services. Last year, the salary scale was 
adjusted to correct some distortions in salaries. Close to 50 employees were fired and rehired with a 
different salary. Salaries are, in general, in line with the market. Promotions are indirectly based on 
performance. Every year, the Human Resources Department coordinates a performance review. The 
results contribute to management assessment of the performance of employees. This in turn 
contributes to promotions. Over the years, SAGUAPAC has developed a practice of promoting from 
within, which has stimulated good performance and has enabled SAGUAPAC to take full advantage 
of personnel with years of training and experience. For instance, a couple of years ago, the 
Commercial Manager was appointed GM and a Department Head took over as Commercial 
Manager. The position of Department Head was, in turn, filled by a person that headed a section 
under that department. Finally, someone who worked in that section was promoted to be the new 
Head of Section. 
3.2 Assessment of the Institutional Environment 
3.2.1 External Autonomy 
Policy formulation and regulation 
In Bolivia, the parliament establishes the general WSS sector framework by law. The executive branch 
defines more specific aspects via Reglamentos enacted as Supreme Decrees. 
A Water Law, mainly oriented at regulating the use of water resources, has been in place since 1906.  
In October 1999, a new WSS sector law (Law 2029) was enacted that established a new regulatory 
framework. In March 2000, Law 2066 was enacted, introducing modifications to Law 2029, in response 
Box 5  SAGUAPAC’s Vision  
“To be a sustainable enterprise, leader in its field in Latin America, 
providing water and sewerage services with the use of modern 
technologies, highly qualified human resources and embracing 
the values of solidarity and service that are part of the 
cooperativist philosophy.” 
Source: SAGUAPAC 
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to the widespread protests that led to the termination of the private concession of WSS services in 
Cochabamba. 
Over time, responsibilities for setting quality as well as service standards for WSS services have been 
shifting between the Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs (MHUA) and the Ministry of Health (MH). In 
1985, quality standards recommended by the World Health Organization (WHO) were adopted and in 
1992, new National Norms for the Provision of Water and Sewerage Services (Reglamento Nacional de 
Servicios de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado) came into force. However, because no effective 
mechanisms were in place for the central government to ensure compliance, in practice each service 
provider defined its own standards. SAGUAPAC voluntarily complied with the WHO standards. 
Up to 1999, SAGUAPAC operated under a license provided by the executive branch,2 which did not 
have the resources or capabilities to rigorously enforce standards. SAGUAPAC operated de facto as a 
self-regulated utility. SAGUAPAC moved to cost recovery at the initiative of its owners rather than at 
the request of an external regulator. 
Since 1998, the Superintendencia de Saneamiento Básico (SISAB) has regulated SAGUAPAC through a 
license contract.3 The license contract (contracto de concession) is an agreement between 
SAGUAPAC and the regulator, in which SAGUAPAC is granted the right to operate as the only WSS 
service provider in a well-defined service area for a period of 40 years.4 The contract specifies 
treatment standards, continuity of service, disconnection criteria, minimum water pressure, handling of 
user complaints, and water quality standards. The specified limits can be adjusted by the regulator 
within the regulatory framework. In addition, the contract incorporates the sources of water that 
SAGUAPAC is authorized to use. SISAB monitors performance with respect to service and quality 
standards. Since 1999, SAGUAPAC has had to have its tariffs approved by SISAB, the same as any 
other regulated water utility in the country.5 Tariffs were set for a five-year period at the time the 
license contract was signed. By law, the utility or the regulator can initiate the procedure for a tariff 
revision after the first three years have elapsed if either deems that significant changes have taken 
place, justifying a change in the tariff. According to the guidelines specified by the regulator, the 
procedure for adjusting tariffs calls for the utility to propose and justify a change in tariff. Tariffs are 
adjusted only after the regulator approves the changes. 
The legal authority of the utility 
SAGUAPAC is owned and, ultimately, controlled by its customers in its service area. Membership in the 
cooperative is open to both individuals and organizations. New members purchase a Certificate of 
Contribution (Certificado de Aportación). This certificate is transferred when the property served by 
the utility is sold. 
SAGUAPAC’s governance structure consists of four layers that reflect territorial aspects as well as a 
functional division of responsibilities (figure 4). {{AU: pls provide a source for figure 4, below the figure.}} 
                                                     
2 Ministerial Resolution No. 206, issued in July 1981 by MHUA, gave SAGUAPAC the right to provide the service and 
to make use of water resources. 
3 SISAB (initially called Superintendence of Water) was part of the newly created regulatory system SIRESE 
composed of five sector Superintendencies and a General Superintendence. The SISAB, as well as the other 
sector superintendencies, was assigned, among other tasks, to grant concessions, monitor the correct delivery of 
services by the companies and entities under its regulating jurisdiction, and approve and publish prices and fees 
in adherence to the sectorial legal standards. While the regulator has existed since 1997, SAGUAPAC became a 
regulated utility only in 1999 after “regularizing” (renewing under the new system) its right to provide water and 
sewerage services with the signing of the license contract for a period of 40 years.  
4 While the rights to operate are given to SAGUAPAC through what in Bolivia has been named a contracto de 
concession, the contract should be understood as a license because all the assets are owned by SAGUAPAC. 
Rather than granting new rights, SAGUAPAC’s concession amounts to extending old rights granted by a different 
regime, under the new rules. Because SAGUAPAC was operating under rights granted by a pre-existing scheme, 
the contract has been the result of a process of negotiation and it can be understood as SAGUAPAC updating its 
right to operate in return for entering the new regulatory scheme (which involves certain obligations related to 
quality and coverage).  
5 In addition, the National Institute of Cooperatives (INALCO), dependent on the National Council of 
Cooperatives (CONALCO) under the Ministry of Labor, ensures that the cooperative’s administration complies 
with the General Law of Cooperatives (Law 5035). 
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Members are elected to serve 
in different capacities in a way 
that ensures a relatively well-
balanced representation of 
the nine districts within the 
service area. Every two years, 
members in each of these 
districts elect their 
representatives to two different 
bodies, the District Board and 
the Delegate Assembly. Five 
members are elected to a 
District Board (president, vice-
president, secretary, and two 
vocals) and three different 
representatives are elected as 
delegates (the president of the 
District Board and two other 
members) to the Delegate 
Assembly.6 The Delegate 
Assembly, composed of 27 members, selects from among its members the nine members of the 
Administration Board and the six members of the Oversight Board. A member of the Administration 
Board is elected President of the cooperative. Members of both the Administrative and the Oversight 
Boards are elected for six-year periods, with one-third of the board members being elected every two 
years. Members of both boards cannot be reelected, but can be elected again after two years from 
the time their last appointment ended.7 The nine members of the Administration Board need not come 
from the nine different districts. It is possible for more than one member to come from the one district 
and for a district not to have a member on this board. 
The District Board represents the district by promoting member participation and conveying the needs 
and interests of its members to the Administration Board. As such, it is a body that represents the 
members in their capacity as users of the service. District Board members receive no compensation 
and their participation is viewed as service to the cooperative. 
The Delegate Assembly is the body that represents the members in their capacity as owners. The 
Delegate Assembly performs a role similar to that of a shareholder meeting in a company. The 
assembly meets on average once a year. Its mandate includes approval of financial statements, 
plans, and the reports of the Administration and Oversight Boards,8 changes to the statutes, and 
adoption of any other significant decisions. The resolutions of the assembly are adopted by simple 
                                                     
6 It is worth noting that members are elected from the pool of members present at meetings called for this 
purpose. Election campaigns put together by members wishing to be elected are not common because being 
elected is generally viewed as being selected to serve rather than obtaining a post. SAGUAPAC often promotes 
the participation of members it has identified as having the appropriate profile (for example, willingness to be 
involved, leadership skills, the respect of the community) and who can be potential contributors. Also, the 
modality of voting is not predefined and is chosen by the members present prior to voting. Each of the nine water 
districts has between 8,000 and 12,000 members who are potential voters. However, the average voter turnout in 
recent elections has been below 500 per district. As could be expected, turnout is lower in those districts that 
already have universal WSS connections. 
7 Members, however, tend to serve more than once. For example, in the current Administration Board, two-thirds 
of the members have served on a prior occasion. 
8 The Ordinary Assembly meets every two years while the Extraordinary Assembly has the responsibility of 
approving the audited financial statements and the reports of the Administration and Oversight Boards. 
Extraordinary Assemblies are normally called by the Administration Board, but can also be called by the Oversight 
Board or by 51percent of the districts. While this does not happen often, it is a mechanism that allows members at 
the district level to be able to prevent the Administration Board from having control over when the General 
Assembly meets. In a similar way, an Extraordinary District Assembly can be called by 51percent of the district 
members. 
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majority and are binding. Delegates must be present to vote and are not allowed to abstain or cast a 
blank vote. 
The Administration Board performs a role similar to that of a traditional board of directors. It is 
responsible for defining policy, approving the budget, appointing the GM, setting salary scales, 
overseeing bidding processes, and informing the Delegate Assembly. The Administration Board signs 
checks for amounts over US$10,000. This procedure, rather than having the function of exercising 
control, is a mechanism for the board to stay informed. No one at SAGUAPAC recalls a case in which 
the Administration Board refused to sign a check requested by management. 
The Oversight Board is a body that has a function akin to that of a controller. It is in charge of 
supervising the administration, with an emphasis on accounting and financial control ensuring the 
administration complies with legal norms. This board hires the external auditors. The Oversight Board 
can veto the resolutions of the Administration Board if they are considered contrary to what the law, 
the statutes, or the resolutions of the Delegate Assembly dictate. A veto does not invalidate the 
resolutions of the Administration Board but it makes it necessary to call an Extraordinary Assembly 
where the matter has to be settled. The Administration Board must meet at least once every 15 days, 
while the Oversight Board must meet at least once every 30 days. Both boards decide by majority 
vote. Decisions are not published but are available to members on request. Since 1997, members 
have been receiving around US$400 per month compensation. 
Working relationship with the political environment 
As a private entity, SAGUAPAC does not depend on political commitment. As a financially viable 
entity it does not depend on public investment to operate and maintain its present system. However, 
public financing is key for investments in service expansion. Nonetheless, as any utility cooperative, 
SAGUAPAC is potentially vulnerable to political interference. In fact, over time there have been 
attempts by politicians who saw SAGUAPAC as a potential political bounty to penetrate its structure. 
SAGUAPAC has been able to resist such attempts. 
SAGUAPAC’s governance structure, in conjunction with the strong sense of ownership of its members, 
has effectively shielded it from political interference. SAGUAPAC’s statutes specify that members 
cannot be elected to the Administration Board if they have an active role in a political party or have 
participated in elections as candidates of a political party within the last five years. The process of 
selecting board members as well as the GM not only ensures that political affiliation is not a 
consideration but also provides for the stability needed for management to act based on a long-term 
orientation. 
The level of effective autonomy of SAGUAPAC can be tested by looking at the level of interference in 
three politically sensitive areas: human resources, service termination, and investments. 
Management does not face any constraints or obligations on the recruitment of staff. Each area 
establishes its personnel requirements and specifies the profiles of needed employees. In the case of 
operational personnel, the decision to hire is adopted by the Area Manager. In the case of 
managerial positions, a search is conducted with the support of the Human Resource Department 
with the decision being made by the corresponding Area Manager, with the approval of the GM.  The 
Administration Board is generally advised of changes in management staff. SAGUAPAC has been able 
to attract and retain qualified personnel through good personnel management practices including 
transparent promotions and competitive pay scales. 
Decisions on termination of service are also made without external interference. The statutes specify 
the following causes that can lead to service termination: failure to pay the Certificate of Contribution; 
clandestine consumption of water or use of sewerage; resistance to comply with membership 
obligations; damage caused to the cooperative; and lack of payment for services. Procedures seek 
to accommodate poor customers by providing some flexibility within pre-specified parameters: a 20 
percent upfront payment and a period of repayment spread over a maximum of 24 months. 
SAGUAPAC has not sought to access credit markets and hence has not obtained a credit rating. In 
addition to internal cash stemming from service fees, financing has been obtained via loans from 
multilateral agencies channeled through government programs. Traditionally, service fees have been 
sufficient to cover operating costs and loans have been used to finance investments. Access to loans 
from multilateral agencies requires that the central government consider the sector a priority as 
SAGUAPAC is one of the beneficiaries. Hence, access to this type of financing does not depend 
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exclusively on SAGUAPAC’s merits, and it is not necessarily available when SAGUAPAC needs it the 
most. The use of financial sources channeled through the government remains the only leverage that 
the government has on SAGUAPAC. Moving to independent financial channels would increase its 
autonomy. 
3.2.2 External Accountability 
The primary accountability of SAGUAPAC is to its members. In addition, the utility is also accountable 
to the regulator and to financing institutions when investments are being funded with external 
financing. 
Accountability to owners and to customers 
The dual role that members have as owners and customers has implications for management’s 
accountability. Management does not account to two different groups with different objectives but to 
one group of members with a sole objective. In principle, distinct channels are in place for 
management to account to members in their roles of owners and customers. In practice, however, 
accountability to both groups tends to center on the same issues and takes place much through the 
same channels (see figure 5). {{AU or DTP: in figure 5, pls consider using something other than color to 
distinguish between "Regularly" and "Periodically but not often" because if this page is photocopied in 
black and white, the difference won't show up. AU: pls provide a source for figure 5.}} 
Accountability to members is achieved through both the Administration Board and the Oversight 
Board. The GM meets with each board twice a month and reports on the state of affairs. Both the 
President and the Treasurer of the Administration Board are present at SAGUAPAC’s offices, and have 
contact with the GM on a daily basis. This type of close contact allows both boards to be abreast of 
what is going on in the utility. Both boards 
report to the Delegate Assembly, which in turn 
reports to the nine District Boards. In addition, 
direct accountability to individual members is 
ensured through information campaigns and 
client service procedures. 
The strong and well-structured accountability 
structure of SAGUAPAC has kept the focus on 
its original purpose of providing a good service. 
SAGUAPAC has developed a customer-
oriented culture that recognizes not only the 
need to pay for the delivery of good services 
but also that payment gives customers the 
right to expect good service. This recognition 
contrasts with that found in less successful 
service cooperatives where the interest of users 
is exclusively in having the lowest possible tariff. 
Over time, the management of SAGUAPAC 
has effectively conveyed, through public 
information campaigns, that good service and 
reasonable tariffs go hand-in-hand. The fact 
that SAGUAPAC is owned by its customers has 
provided credibility to this message. 
Accountability to regulator 
Since 1997, SAGUAPAC has had stronger 
accountability to its regulator, SISAB. SAGUAPAC has had to demonstrate to SISAB both the fulfillment 
of the obligations set forth in the license contract and its compliance with quality and service 
standards. SAGUAPAC maintains relatively close contact with SISAB, meeting at least once a month 
and presenting information periodically. SISAB conducts inspections regularly to check on factors 
relevant to service provision and quality. 
SAGUAPAC already had financially sustainable tariff levels before the adoption of the present 
regulatory system. Since then it has managed to make necessary adjustments in tariffs to keep pace 
Figure 5  Accountability to Owners and Customers 
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with inflation and changes in other costs. In this respect SAGUAPAC’s behavior has been significantly 
different from what at the time were public WSS utilities providing services in the other two major cities 
in Bolivia (La Paz and Cochabamba). While SAGUAPAC was able to isolate itself from political 
interference pushing for tariff adjustments on technical grounds, the two public utilities avoided 
necessary tariff increases for political reasons. 
In 1999, SAGUAPAC had its tariffs approved by SISAB for a five-year period. A tariff revision is currently 
underway to set tariffs for another five-year period starting in mid-2004. In this review, SISAB has 
required SAGUAPAC to apply the same formula that is applied by private utilities. The formula allows 
for the tariff to incorporate a 13 percent return on assets to account for the cost of capital. 
SAGUAPAC has found ways to reduce the assets taken into account for purposes of tariff calculation, 
to keep tariff increases to a minimum. 
For the moment, the regulatory reform and the creation of SISAB have not had a significant effect on 
the performance of SAGUAPAC. Service and quality standards as well as tariff levels have not 
changed significantly. Regulation has served to make some of the internal monitoring more 
transparent to outsiders. It has also introduced some costs in the form of the regulatory fee (1.5 
percent of revenues) and the resources required to tend to the regulator’s requirements. 
Investment requirements 
Prior to 1997, SAGUAPAC was not required to meet 
investment targets. During that time, the investments 
that were made followed SAGUAPAC’s own 
development plan and depended on its ability to 
secure funding. Since 1997, SAGUAPAC has been 
subject to expansion targets to be achieved within the 
first five years of the license contract. SISAB monitors 
expansion targets using SAGUAPAC’s yearly operating 
plan. SAGUAPAC has performed relatively well with 
respect to meeting its expansion targets. While targets 
have not necessarily been met every year, targets for 
sewerage connections have been met over the five-
year period while those for new water connections 
have been almost 90 percent achieved. SISAB did 
exercise its legal authority to sanction SAGUAPAC since 
progress was acceptable and a notification was sufficient. 
Accountability to financial institutions 
In those cases in which SAGUAPAC has obtained external financing to undertake work, it has adhered 
to strict reporting requirements. The financing sources that SAGUAPAC has accessed on different 
occasions are multilateral financial institutions such as the World Bank and the Inter-American 
Development Bank. Loans were granted to the state, which on-lent to different institutions within the 
framework of sector development programs. SAGUAPAC did not have difficulties complying with any 
of the reporting requirements. 
3.3 Assessment of the Internal Functioning of the Utility 
3.3.1 Internal Autonomy: Decentralization of Authority within the Utility 
Traditionally, SAGUAPAC has been highly centralized. Only in the last year has SAGUAPAC gradually 
started decentralizing decision making internally. 
Decentralization of decision making on financial management matters has been limited to billing and 
collection. Because service is not automatically terminated for lack of payment, the Commercial 
Manager can decide on a payment plan to be agreed on with the customer. Other financial 
decisions such as determining the tariff structure, setting connection fees, entering loan agreements, 
or appointing an external auditor are adopted at the board level. 
Major decisions on operations and maintenance have also been traditionally centralized. The 
Administration Board sets work processes and standards and approves any significant decisions 
Table 2  SAGUAPAC’s Expansion Targets 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Water connections per year 
Target 6,778 7,000 4,730 4,730 4,730 
Achieved 6,778 6,606 5,109 3,753 2,474 
Sewerage connections per year 
Target 4,632 1,200 5,541 5,035 7,629 
Achieved 4,632 1,155 1,034 8,034 9,337 
Source: Superintendencia de Servicios Básicos.   
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related to procurement or to the expansion, rehabilitation, or maintenance of the existing network 
and facilities. The approval takes place at the time the Annual Operating Plan is approved. For 
unforeseen circumstances, the GM can approve proposals of the Area Managers. Day-to-day 
operational decisions such as maintenance and meter replacement are made by the Area 
Managers, within pre-specified procedures. 
Key decisions on human resources, such as the hiring and firing of the General Manager Director, and 
the determination of salary structure, are made by the Administration Board. The hiring and firing of 
individual staff members as well as their promotion or demotion are proposed by Area Managers and 
approved by the GM. 
Procedures for customer management, such as service termination, complaint handling, modalities of 
payments, or educational and public relations campaigns, are approved by the Administration Board. 
The Commercial Manager can make smaller decisions within this procedural framework. 
SAGUAPAC has recently started to decentralize decision making by involving a much wider group of 
people in the programming of tasks and goals. Indications are that this will be pursued in earnest in the 
near future to increase efficiency and customer responsiveness. The Managerial Commission 
empowers Department Heads through biweekly coordination meetings that inform decisions by the 
GM.  Targets and budgeted activities for the Annual Operating Program are now proposed by Section 
Heads, rather than Department Heads. The plans of Section Heads are discussed with the 
corresponding Department and Unit Heads and with the Area Managers. The involvement of lower 
levels in the planning process is creating a greater degree of commitment and responsibility. While 
operational decisions have not yet been decentralized, a new practice is being instituted whereby 
any time a problem arises and a decision is needed, a course of action has to be proposed at the 
section level. 
3.3.2 Internal Accountability for Results 
Accountability to the boards 
The performance of the utility is measured in relation to the accomplishment of the goals set in the 
Annual Operating Program. These goals reflect the targets defined in the five-year plan, which are in 
line with the ones agreed on with SISAB in the license contract. 
The close contact between the management team and both the Administration and the Oversight 
Boards ensures that both boards are well-informed about the affairs of the cooperative. The 
Administration Board has never rewarded or penalized the GM based on his performance although 
that possibility exists. 
Managerial accountability 
SAGUAPAC uses a value-based approach whereby poor performance is dealt with through a 
combination of support and motivation. The GM routinely evaluates the achievement of targets. 
Performance of Department Heads—and recently Section Heads—is monitored. However, formal 
rewards or penalties are not applied in relation to performance. In case of poor performance, the 
causes are identified, training or other support is given to staff, and staff is encouraged to solve the 
problems.  In case of good performance, immediate feedback and public recognition is provided. 
Indirectly, and in the longer term, good performance is rewarded with promotions. 
3.3.3 Customer Orientation 
Customer orientation is at the heart of SAGUAPAC’s mission. The rights and obligations of members (as 
customers and owners) are spelled out in SAGUAPAC’s statutes. Customers can make their voices 
heard through strong, cooperative-specific channels. 
The dependence of SAGUAPAC on its customers for financing further contributes to customer 
orientation. 
The cooperative model and ensuing practices provide customers with a sense of closeness to the 
utility. The threshold for customers to request a meeting with a manager or to send a letter to the GM is 
low. If need be, SAGUAPAC organizes customer meetings in districts or areas where problems exist. For 
instance, recently, six customers representing over 10,000 members in areas affected by foul odors 
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from a sewerage treatment plant requested a meeting and were received and heard by 
management. 
In addition, SAGUAPAC uses more traditional channels to facilitate individual consumer complaints, 
such as phone or in-person access to a specialized Department of Consumer Service. User satisfaction 
measurements and, more recently, an Image Audit study seek to establish the external perception of 
the utility. 
The strong customer orientation is also evident in (a) the flexible disconnection policies, (b) the training 
provided to those employees that deal directly with customers, (c) a special evaluation that 
emphasizes human relations being given to those employees, and (d) the use of different media 
(newspaper, radio, letters, and bulletins) to inform customers of any changes in service provision. 
In addition, certain initiatives have been taken that go beyond service provision. Relatively recently, 
recognizing that some members’ ability to pay their bills was affected by the economic crisis in Bolivia, 
SAGUAPAC organized courses for housewives and young people to help them acquire a trade and 
generate some additional income. This mission creep has not yet distracted SAGUAPAC from its main 
mission. 
While SAGUAPAC shows a very strong customer orientation, it also shows a clear understanding that 
good service is a two-way street: it can be delivered only when the beneficiary pays. To ensure 
customers’ awareness of the value of water, and to avoid waste and lack of control, only house 
connections are offered. However, some households agree to make their connection accessible to 
other people. In the view of SAGUAPAC, the fact that the owner is responsible for paying the bill 
ensures that the proper care and control is exercised in the use of water. 
3.3.4 Market Orientation 
Market orientation is the explicit and systematic search and use of market references (costs and prices 
of services) through out-contracting, benchmarking, or market testing to improve performance. The 
market orientation of SAGUAPAC has always been very limited. SAGUAPAC does not contract out any 
of its operational and maintenance activities. Only major construction activities are contracted out. 
For this, SAGUAPAC uses the World Bank procurement guidelines. In the early 1990s, the termination of 
service to nonpaying customers was contracted out to the private sector on an experimental basis. 
However, this initiative did not last long—it was decided to return to in-house billing because the cut-
off policy applied by the private contractor proved too inflexible. In general, only non-strategic 
services have been considered for outsourcing. Cleaning services are outsourced. Only recently have 
other services, such as hardware technical support, security services, and maintenance of wastewater 
treatment plants, been considered for outsourcing. 
Neither management nor the Administration Board has engaged in benchmarking or market testing in 
a systematic manner. The comparison of either its performance or its costs with external references has 
been occasional. However, management has traditionally been well-informed with respect to 
international performance standards and has used them implicitly as references. 
3.4 Conclusion 
SAGUAPAC’s results in its service area make it one of the better-performing water utilities in Latin 
America (see annex). However, when studying SAGUAPAC as a model for service provision, it is useful 
to go beyond performance indicators to adopt a broader perspective. 
3.4.1 Assessment of SAGUAPAC’s Governance Regime 
SAGUAPAC’s success is partly attributable to those characteristics that derive directly from its 
cooperative structure. Its organizational structure has enabled it to isolate decisions from political 
interference, adopt decisions unrestricted by cumbersome procedures, and maintain a strong 
consumer-oriented focus. These characteristics represent a possible advantage over the public 
model. The largest advantage over the private investor-owned model is the strong customer 
orientation. 
The degree of external autonomy SAGUAPAC enjoys is high in light of its private nature, the 
composition of its two Boards (Administration and Oversight), its regulatory environment, and the way 
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it has kept political influence at bay. The autonomy of the utility is restricted by its limited access to 
external financing. In contrast, the degree of internal autonomy has been relatively low because the 
institution has been operating for most of its existence under a highly hierarchical scheme with little 
room for decisions to be made at different levels. Only recently have important steps toward 
increased decentralization been taken. 
SAGUAPAC’s external accountability to owner-customers has traditionally been high, while 
accountability to the regulator has increased significantly during the last few years. In contrast, 
accountability within the organization has been low, as the decentralization of responsibilities has 
been generally limited. 
SAGUAPAC’s customer orientation is excellent. A high degree of sensitivity to customers’ situations and 
needs has been ensured by the strong presence of members in the affairs of the utility combined with 
the fact that consumer fees constitute a very significant part of SAGUAPAC’s financing. Furthermore, 
the cooperative’s governance structure provides different channels for customers to voice their 
opinions. In addition, more traditional complaint mechanisms are also used. 
For most of its existence as a cooperative, SAGUAPAC has not undertaken systematic efforts to 
benchmark, market test, or outsource. However, some degree of market orientation has always been 
present in the form of informal benchmarking. 
3.4.2 Other Critical Success Factors 
The success of SAGUAPAC is not solely attributable to the cooperative model. Three additional factors 
have been identified as critical for SAGUAPAC’s success: (a) its governance regime; (b) the continuity 
of its management; and (c) the environment in which it operates. 
The governance regime – The particular electoral system of SAGUAPAC is key to its success. The 
layered way in which District Board, Delegate Assembly, Administration Board, and Oversight Board 
members are chosen ensures a higher degree of representation of elected members. It also 
contributes to elections being closely scrutinized by voting members and to closer monitoring by 
members at large. A great number of cooperatives, however, opt for an election process featuring 
direct voting in a general assembly. Such a process makes the choice of board members akin to a 
political election with “candidates” seeking votes and voting members having less information on 
prospective board members. 
The strong member participation in SAGUAPAC helps maintain a strong customer orientation and 
encourages a high degree of integrity among elected officers. The relatively long term (six years) and 
the staggered replacement of board members (one-third of members every two years) ensure 
continuity and steady rotation. Finally, the requirement that members of District, Administrative, and 
Oversight Boards may not be directly re-elected, but rather must wait two years after the end of their 
term of office before running again limits corruption. 
Continuity of management – A second characteristic particular to SAGUAPAC is its corporate culture. 
SAGUAPAC’s employees show a strong service orientation with values that serve any organization 
well. The development of this corporate culture can be traced to the personality of the GM who 
headed SAGUAPAC for close to 18 years. The effect that good managers have on shaping 
organizations and defining their culture is something that goes beyond the particular model or 
organization. Low staff turnover and promotion policies have further strengthened this corporate 
culture. 
The environment in which SAGUAPAC operates – A third critical success factor for SAGUAPAC is 
external to the organization. As mentioned earlier, Santa Cruz grew in isolation and under relative 
neglect from the central government. This resulted in a population with a high degree of self-reliance 
and a strong sense of regional identity. A well-organized and powerful civic movement existed. This 
particular environment is very favorable to cooperatives. 
Thus, in addition to the cooperative structure, which has some particular characteristics, three other 
ingredients, more difficult to replicate, have been present in the case of SAGUAPAC and seem to be 
partly responsible for its success. 
 19 
3.4.3 The Limitations of SAGUAPAC 
Sewerage coverage in SAGUAPAC’s service area is considerably lower than water supply coverage. 
The consequent use of septic tanks causes groundwater quality problems. The main reason cited by 
SAGUAPAC’s personnel for the low coverage in sewerage services is the extremely high investment 
costs associated with sewerage. SAGUAPAC considers that the required level of investment needed to 
achieve greater coverage would increase tariffs beyond users’ ability to pay. 
SAGUAPAC’s service area encompasses only about 66 percent of the population living in the five 
inner rings of the city of Santa Cruz. The question of whether SAGUAPAC’s performance would be any 
different if it served the poorer outer rings of the city is relevant for assessing the cooperative model. 
Based on the cooperative’s performance so far, it is reasonable to assume that SAGUAPAC could 
provide service to all of Santa Cruz without considerably hurting its performance. However, for a 
variety of reasons, SAGUAPAC has not expanded its service area. 
The lack of coverage by SAGUAPAC in the outer rings has given birth to a range of smaller water 
cooperatives since the 1970s. These cooperatives, joined  together in the Asociación de Cooperativas 
de Agua y Alcantarillado de Santa Cruz, now provide water supply to approximately 350,000 people. 
In the outer rings sewerage is almost nonexistent. Over the years, SAGUAPAC has made significant 
attempts to absorb two of the smaller cooperatives, but progress has been slow. Different reasons are 
cited for this. The differentiated treatment that the regulator gives to the smaller cooperatives by not 
obliging them to comply with the same standards as the ones set for SAGUAPAC hinders aggregation. 
SAGUAPAC cites the presence of vested interests on the part of some members in the smaller 
cooperatives. However, other sources state that the leadership of SAGUAPAC has deliberately slowed 
down the expansion of its services beyond the fifth ring.9  The current situation does reflect a limitation 
of the cooperative model. The members of a cooperative inherently will be more interested in 
maintaining good services for a low price within the existing service area than in expanding to new 
areas if this implies higher costs. 
Expansion of water supply and sewerage services requires capital investment. Despite its recognized 
good performance, SAGUAPAC has had limited access to financing. In the past, SAGUAPAC has 
accessed concessional multilateral financing through on-lending from the government. However, 
concessional multilateral financing depends on government priority setting, over which SAGUAPAC 
has no direct influence. In principle, the cooperative model weakens access to concessional 
multilateral financing for the sector. In practice, there are two ways in which this can be ameliorated: 
(a) with the adoption of a sector financing policy that assigns concessional financing obtained by the 
country for the water and sanitation sector based on the impact it can have rather than the 
ownership type of the utility; and (b) through lobbying and regional political pressure—an ad hoc 
alternative. 
While SAGUAPAC’s statutes allow for borrowing from other sources, the cooperative has not tapped 
financial markets yet, hoping to obtain additional cheaper financing from multilateral institutions. It 
can be argued that the ability of SAGUAPAC to access capital markets to finance an expansion of 
the area it serves would be the true test for its success. 
                                                     
9 See, for instance, “Organisational Structure and Performance in Urban Water Supply: The Case of the Saguapac 
Co-operative in Santa Cruz, Bolivia,” Andrew Nickson, School of Public Policy, University of Birmingham, UK, not 
dated. 
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4 CONCLUSIONS: A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT 
The lessons learned from the SAGUAPAC case study are reinforced by literature on both poorly 
performing and well-functioning utilities. A number of conclusions can be drawn. 
4.1 Consumer Cooperatives Can Offer an Alternative Institutional Model for 
Delivery of Urban Water Supply and Sanitation Services 
The cooperative model has a number of potential advantages over private and public utility models. 
All utility cooperatives are characterized by the facts that owners and customers are the same and 
that cooperatives do not have a profit objective. All utility cooperatives have two boards 
(Administration and Oversight), and the one member–one vote election system. The ownership model 
and governance structure can result in a clear objective for the utility: provide sustainable service at 
affordable cost. The fact that any cost reductions are translated into lower tariffs constitutes a strong 
incentive to pursue efficiency. Other advantages are the flexibility associated with the absence of 
cumbersome procedures, and a strong customer orientation derived from the alignment of objectives. 
4.2 Critical Success Factors for Well-Performing Consumer Cooperatives 
Performance of utility cooperatives varies 
widely. The practices an organization adopts 
are a determining factor in the results it 
achieves. Poorly performing utility 
cooperatives are often associated with 
ineffective management, a weak financial 
position, incompetent directors, employee 
dishonesty, nepotism, and even corruption. 
Well-functioning utility cooperatives provide 
dependable services to all members, do not 
discriminate, and are governed by a fair and 
uncorrupted management.  
The cooperative structure by itself does not 
necessarily constitute a better option for the delivery of urban WSS services (figure 6). Indeed, no 
ownership structure—public, private, or cooperative—is a sufficient condition for success if it functions 
in the wrong external conditions or without proper design and practices. 
4.2.1 Design 
Successful cooperatives are normally those able to attract capable and committed board members, 
achieve a high degree of participation, isolate their decisions from political influence, and maintain an 
environment in which cooperative values thrive. 
The particular form in which the cooperative principles are put to practice is specified in the statutes of 
a cooperative. One important design factor is the election procedures for the board. Successful 
cooperatives have election procedures that favor the selection of technically capable members and 
ensure that all members feel well represented, thus fostering wide member participation. Over time, 
election procedures should also motivate elected members to serve for a sufficiently long period to 
guarantee a reasonable degree of continuity, but also force rotation to ensure that new ideas are 
brought in and that particular members do not become entrenched. 
Open and transparent procedures that minimize the possibility of manipulation or opportunistic 
behavior are conducive to electing the type of directors needed. Capable board members normally 
select and develop quality management teams and can help a cooperative maintain its focus, 
providing only the goods and services members use. In contrast, poor selection of directors who fail to 
take responsibility is normally associated with lack of effective oversight, which often results in 
unsuccessful cooperatives. 
Figure 6  The Link between Structure and Outcomes 
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Source: Authors 
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Another important design factor is the human resources policy of a cooperative. Appointment 
procedures should be clear and transparent. The Administration Board should have the authority to 
hire and fire the General Manager.  A fixed term can strengthen continuity. Hiring from within and 
performance-based promotions and salaries strengthen the bond between the cooperative and its 
staff. Poorly performing utility cooperatives often have high staff ratios, because board members and 
managers use the utility to provide jobs to allies. 
The degree of participation depends on the internal structure of the cooperative, including the way in 
which board members and managers are elected and the effectiveness of the institutional 
mechanisms by which feedback from members is obtained. Participation can also be influenced by 
size—a larger membership can translate into a weaker identification with the cooperative and 
introduce disincentives to participate. Members tend to be more willing to participate to the extent 
that they feel represented by the elected board members and believe their input is taken into 
account. Maintaining an environment conducive to member participation not only allows individual 
members to provide feedback but also helps strengthen their role as the “watchful eye” of the 
cooperative. Lack of participation from members who never ask questions often translates into few 
individuals making policy and forming cliques and special interest groups within the cooperative. 
Finally, the design of a cooperative should provide effective barriers to political interference. Political 
influence introduces criteria other than technical considerations in decision making and can quickly 
interfere with a cooperative’s performance. A cooperative utility captured by politicians normally 
adopts multiple objectives beyond that of good service provision. While the procedure for electing 
board members is critical in shielding a cooperative from political influence, external support on the 
part of local institutions also seems to play an important role. Excluding active politicians from being 
elected, rotating elected members often, and incorporating other checks and balances are often 
found to be practices associated with cooperatives that manage to keep political influence at bay. 
Also, an alert membership that recognizes the potentially harmful effects of political influence is 
essential for shielding the cooperative. Members can often act through other local institutions to 
provide support to the cooperative in an effort to resist the presence of political interests. 
With respect to design, SAGUAPAC’s experience presents some useful lessons. The dual tier election 
system, with the district-based election process for Assembly Delegates, ensures balanced member 
participation. The District Boards ensure closeness of representatives with the members they represent. 
They also ensure that qualified candidates are put forward for other boards that tend to be well-
known in their community. Also, the fact that representatives are not paid guarantees that only those 
members with a true desire to serve get involved. Fixed and staggered terms ensure a sensible degree 
of continuity. At the same time, term limits stifle corruption. 
4.2.2 Practices 
Appropriate design of a cooperative can promote practices that contribute to autonomy, external 
accountability, and customer orientation. SAGUAPAC scores high in adopting these practices. 
SAGUAPAC does not demonstrate high levels of internal decentralization and market orientation.  
SAGUAPAC’s case shows that not all these attributes are necessary to achieve good performance. 
Further decentralization, internal accountability, and market orientation would probably improve 
performance even more. It also reflects the fact that effective and longstanding leadership can 
improve performance. However, an organization that is person-dependent may prove vulnerable 
when changes occur. SAGUAPAC has managed to institutionalize certain practices, thus making the 
organization less dependent on particular persons. 
Good financial management and planning is a critical practice for well-performing utility 
cooperatives. The dual role of members as owners and as customers facilitates the acceptance on 
the part of users of the need to adjust tariffs to cover costs because there is recognition that tariffs will 
be raised only to maintain the service and not to increase profits. The strong accountability in 
cooperatives leads to sound financial management practices and information systems that focus on 
cost control and performance parameters. However, access to financing of capital investment for 
expanding services can be hard to obtain as autonomy from the state increases. 
Although the cooperative model inherently includes collective customer participation systems, 
customer orientation can be further enhanced through improvement of service and information to 
individual customers. Steps to improve services to individual customers include (a) providing a menu of 
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levels of service delivery, (b) improving modes of billing and collection, (c) instituting flexible 
disconnection policies, (d) improving information to individual customers, and (e) establishing a timely 
and effective complaint process. 
The cooperative model gives strong incentives for efficiency because there is strong pressure to keep 
tariffs low. Efficiency gains can arise from both human resources, technical, and organizational 
practices. Cooperatives normally have human resources practices that are a mix of traditional public 
employment (high job security and salaries, and promotions based on longevity) and more incentive-
based, private-sector approaches. Well-functioning utility cooperatives achieve low staff turnover 
through market-based salaries, performance evaluations for staff, and linking  promotion and salaries 
to performance. Cooperatives have a strong focus on developing the technical and managerial 
capacity within their organizations. Most successful utilities are at the forefront of technical and 
organizational innovation. Introducing monitoring, standard processes, and business planning are also 
practices associated with successful utility cooperatives. Lines of accountability and responsibilities are 
clearly spelled out. Benchmarking information is used—implicitly or explicitly—by management of a 
utility to assess performance gaps. Outsourcing is normally low in cooperatives, because the incentive 
to secure employment in house is often stronger than the cost savings of outsourcing. However, 
because cooperatives are not bound by public procurement procedures, contracting can be done 
quickly. 
4.2.3 Conditions 
External conditions are beyond the cooperative’s control but play an important role in determining 
how effective and efficient a cooperative utility is. Some external conditions, such as the availability of 
water resources, will affect all utilities in a similar way, regardless of their particular structure. 
Accordingly, when considering cooperative utilities, the focus should be on those external conditions 
that affect the functioning of cooperatives in particular. Three conditions appear to be particularly 
important: (a) the size of the population the cooperative serves; (b) the strength of state presence; 
and (c) the degree to which the population has a culture of civic service. 
The size of the population plays an important role in a cooperative’s success. In general, smaller 
cooperatives have performed better than larger ones. The main cause is that the relationship 
between members and management of the utility is more direct. However, small cooperatives might 
be at a disadvantage in finding technically qualified members to appoint to their boards. The existing 
literature suggests that a cooperative’s ability to attract capable and committed board members is 
also influenced by rewards associated with serving and the board member selection procedures. 
Cooperatives seem to work better in those places where the state has been unable to provide the 
services needed, and, as a result, the population has come to realize that it must become organized 
and take responsibility for providing its own services. In contrast, in places where some sort of 
paternalism is present, fed by a stronger presence of the state (which may have attempted to provide 
the service), a community’s predisposition to look to itself for a solution might be weak. 
Related to this, an essential ingredient for a cooperative to work well is the willingness of its members to 
serve. If a culture of service is not present, participation may be low, taking away one of the strong 
points a cooperative arrangement has to offer. In places where attitudes are such that a low degree 
of participation can be expected, a different structure might be more effective. A strong culture of 
civic service causes the population to participate actively and take responsibility. If the population 
does not take an active interest, a cooperative might be readily subject to political interference or 
capture by a group of people that will impose their personal objectives on it. 
4.3 How Can the Cooperative Model be Used in Sector Reform Processes? 
Two sequential considerations determine whether the cooperative model is a suitable model to 
improve WSS sector performance. The first consideration is whether the cooperative structure seems 
appropriate for the case at hand. The second, if the answer to the first question is positive, concerns 
the appropriate way of introducing the cooperative structure to increase the likelihood of success. 
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4.3.1 When is the Cooperative Structure Appropriate? 
The cooperative model can be introduced in two ways: transformation of an existing public utility or 
the start up of a greenfield utility cooperative. To establish whether transformation or start up of a utility 
cooperative is applicable to improve WSS services provision in a city, the situation should be carefully 
evaluated to determine (a) the prevailing external conditions and (b) the extent and pattern of 
coverage and the performance of the existing utility. 
The purpose of the first step is to establish whether the external conditions necessary for a cooperative 
to fulfill its promise exist. The best indication of good external conditions for cooperatives is the 
presence of other cooperatives in a country or a city. The presence of other well-functioning utility 
cooperatives is a predictor that a WSS cooperative will probably perform well. Another indicator for a 
good enabling environment is the degree to which the population has a culture of civic service. This is 
normally present in places where the state has not had a strong presence, or has a dismal track 
record. 
The purpose of the second step is to determine whether the cooperative structure can fulfill WSS sector 
objectives. When considering coverage and performance, three distinct general cases could lead to 
a desire for change. These cases, illustrated in figure 7, are  
• good performance with limited coverage; 
• full coverage with poor performance; and 
• poor performance with partial coverage. 
The transformation of an existing utility into a cooperative is best suited for improving performance and 
less suited for the purpose of expanding service. Thus, the transformation model is best suited for case II 
in the figure, in which a utility has full coverage but poor performance. It also has some merit for case 
III, in which poor performance is coupled with 
low coverage. The transformation model is least 
suited for case I, in which the main purpose is to 
expand coverage. The start up of a greenfield 
utility cooperative is most suited for cases I and 
III and not suited for case II, in which the existing 
utility serves all customers. The decision on the 
more appropriate alternative will depend on 
the spatial distribution of coverage (that is, 
pockets of unserved or areas of unserved) and 
on the reasons for which coverage has fallen 
short. 
4.3.2 How to Transform a Utility into a 
Cooperative 
Transforming a public utility into a cooperative 
is similar to directed privatization because the 
future owners are predefined. A number of 
issues need to be considered beyond those 
concerning the transfer of ownership itself. 
Probably the most important aspect is that of establishing the appropriate design because it will be a 
key determinant of the cooperative’s performance. Design decisions have to be well thought through 
and made before the transfer takes place. Once established, it will be hard to change the power 
structure entrenched in the design of the cooperative. As mentioned, the key issues of design are 
related to the way members are chosen to both the Administration and the Oversight Boards so as to 
ensure broad and balanced participation with adequate rotation  and to discourage political 
interference. Moreover, the design should provide the necessary checks and balances in the form of 
effective mechanisms that guarantee members will be properly represented. Finally, it should provide 
clear definitions of roles and responsibilities. The design can make or break the adoption of certain 
practices within the future cooperative, such as rules and mechanisms for personnel selection and 
promotion that contribute to a stable, performance-oriented work environment. 
Coverage 
Partial Full 
Quality
High 
Poor 
I
II III
Figure 7  Scenarios of Performance and Coverage 
Source: Authors 
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The history of the utility also needs to be considered. A utility that has been associated with below-cost 
tariffs for a long period may have conditioned the population to expect that service will be subsidized. 
If that is the case, the willingness of the population to get involved and to take on the challenge to 
change expectations while aligning them with the reality of service provision will be needed. Similarly, 
the transformation of overstaffed utilities can lead to labor conflicts and can harm the credibility of the 
social objectives of the newly established cooperative. 
Choices traditionally encountered in reform processes, that is, choosing between shock and 
gradualism, are very much a part of a transformation strategy. 
4.4 Final Remarks 
The cooperative model presents some attractive attributes that make it a potential alternative for the 
provision of urban WSS services. However, it is not an appropriate option in all cases. The choice 
depends on whether the external conditions provide an enabling environment for the cooperative 
principles to be put effectively into practice. In such an environment, the cooperative model could be 
introduced either by transformation of an existing utility or by start up of a greenfield utility 
cooperative. In both cases, the design and practices of the cooperative are critically important. 
The cooperative model is not an end in itself and does not guarantee success. The challenge is not so 
much in trying to determine whether cooperatives are an appropriate alternative for the delivery of 
urban WSS services, but in the careful consideration of whether and how the cooperative model can 
be adjusted in its design and practices to suit the particular circumstances of a given city and country. 
Only after such careful consideration will cooperatives be successful in effectively delivering and 
expanding sustainable services. 
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ANNEX  SAGUAPAC:  PERFORMANCE INDICATORS 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Effectiveness 
Service coverage (%) 
Water 93 94 95 95 95 
Sewerage 39 38 44 51 50 
Availability of service (%) 
Water 99.36 99,76 99.86 99.98 99.92 
Number of connections 
Water 109,147 114,256 118,009 120,483 123,597 
Sewerage 45,405 46,439 54,473 63,810 64,096 
Efficiency 
Technical efficiency 
Unaccounted for water - UFW (%) 23 24 23 17 17 
Staff per 1,000 connections 3.7 3,6 3.5 3.3 3.1 
Metered connections (%) 98 98 97 97 97 
Operating cost (US$/m3)  2.6 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.3 
      
Financial efficiency 
Average tariff (US$/m3)      
Water 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 
Sewerage 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 
Working ratio 0.60 0.68 0.70 0.60 0.55 
Collection efficiency (%) 98 97 93 91 95 
Customer service 
Complaint  index (% solved) 84 96 94 95 95 
 
Source: Saguapac
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